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QuALIFIED: MEDICAID PROVIDER
AGREEMENTS, WAIVERS, AND THE POLITICS
OF PLANNED PARENTHOOD
Morgan Handley*

ABSTRACT
Over the last decade, a growing minority ofAmericans have come to favor "defunding"
Planned Parenthood, which provides family planning care to millions of Americans
through Medicaid at over 800 locations. Planned Parenthood also provides abortions
with private funds. Following budget fights in 2011 and two rounds of doctored
"undercover sting" videos in 2011 and 2015, several states have undertaken to bar
entities that provide abortion care, including Planned Parenthood, from contracting
as Medicaid providers. In 2012, Texas chose to forego $35 million annually in federal
Medicaid funds in order to advance its agenda to "defund" Planned Parenthood. With
the Department of Health and Human Services under new political management, the
state now requests that federal funding be restored on the very terms that caused it to be
terminated in 2012: the exclusion of abortion providers.
This note examines the permissibility of categorical bars on certain types of family
planning providers under existing federal Medicaid law in both traditional Medicaid
and discretionary expandedfamily planning programs, with a case-specific examination
of Texas s efforts to remove Planned Parenthood from its Medicaid operations.
This note argues that it is illegal to enforce abortion provider contract bans within
traditional Medicaid, and the violation offederal law may not be waived. As a result,
Texas spending request to expand family planning benefits with the provider ban in
place should be denied.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Social Security Act (SSA), which contains federal Medicaid law, provides
that Medicaid beneficiaries may access covered services from any provider who is
qualified and willing to offer the necessary care. 1 This mandate is commonly known
as the free choice of provider provision. 2 As the participation of Planned Parenthood
affiliated clinics as providers of government-financed health care, such as Medicaid
family planning services, became increasingly controversial, several states sought
to bar entities providing abortion care and their affiliates from contracting with and
receiving funds from the state governments. 3 In effect, these states are attempting to bar
politically disfavored providers from contracting as Medicaid providers, which reduces
patient choice. 4 The states urge that their contract bans do not violate the free choice
provision, but are a proper exercise of state authority to define the term "qualified" for
the purposes Medicaid to exclude abortion providers and their affiliates. 5 However, the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which supervises Medicaid at the
federal level, has historically viewed these laws as in direct conflict with the free choice
provision. 6 Every court to reach the merits of a challenge to the state law contract bans
or terminations of provider contracts for similar reasons under traditional Medicaid has
enjoined the removal of providers on the grounds that they run afoul of free choice. 7

1

Social Security Act, 42 US.C § 1396a(a)(23) (2012).

2

See Letter from Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs. Director Vikki Wachino to State Medicaid
Directors, Re: Clarifying Free Choice of Provider Requirement in Conjunction with State Authority
to Take Action Against Medicaid Providers, State Medicaid Director Letter# 16-005 (Apr. 19, 2016)
[hereinafter Clarifying Free Choice] https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/dmvnloads/
smdl6005.pdf
3

See Tex. Hum. Res. Code§ 32.024(c-1) (2017) (instructing the Commissioner of the Texas Health
and Human Services Commission to ensure that no funds from a family planning demonstration
project are dispensed to entities that provide abortions or their affiliates); see also Burns Ind.
Code Ami. § 5-22-17-5.5 (2011) (prohibiting all state agencies from entering into contracts
with or awarding grants to any entity that provides abortions); see also Fla. Stat§ 390.0111(15)
(2018) (prohibiting state and local agencies and managed care entities from contracting with or
making payments to clinics licensed to perform abortions); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat § 35-196.05
(2012) (forbidding state agencies from entering into contracts with or awarding grants to abortion
providers); see also Alexandra Zavis, Defund Planned Parenthood Has Gained Momentum: Texas
Shows How Extensive the Effects Can Be, LA TIMES (May 30, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/
nation/la-na-texas-planned-parenthood-20170530-story.htmL
4

See Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F3d 960, 969 (9th Cir. 2013), Planned
Parenthood ofind., Inc. v. Comm'r of the Ind. State Dep't of Health, 699 F3d 962, 978 (7th Cir.
2012), Complaint at iJ 19, Texas v. Sebelius (WD. Tex. 2012) (No. 6: 12-cv-62).

5

See Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Missouri v. Andersen, 882 F3d 1205, 1230 (10th Cir.
2018), cert. denied, 2018 WL 1456394 (2018); see also Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast v. Gee,
862 F3d 445, 465 (5th Cir. 2017), cert denied, 139 S. Ct 408 (2018); Planned Parenthood Ariz.,
Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F3d 960, 969 (9th Cir. 2013); Planned Parenthood oflnd., Inc. v. Comm'r of the
Ind. State Dep't of Health, 699 F3d 962, 980 (7th Cir. 2012).
6

See Clarifying Free Choice, supra note 2.

7

See Andersen, 882 F3d at 1230; see also Gee, 862 F3d at 465; Betlach, 727 F3d at 969; Planned
Parenthood Ind, 699 F3d at 980.
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In 2012, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) ended an expanded
discretionary family planning program in Texas after the state insisted on enforcing
its contract ban in the event of renewal. 8 CMS took the position that allowing Texas to
enforce the ban would be inconsistent with the requirements of the expanded programs,
and subsequently terminated similar programs for the same reasons. 9 These expanded
family planning programs, or "Waivers," were an exercise of the Secretary's authority
under§ 1115 of the SSA to waive certain provisions of the law and create demonstration
projects when the Waivers are considered likely to promote the objectives of the Act. 10
After self-funding a replacement program on its own terms, Texas seeks authorization to
create a new Waiver under § 1115 that is substantially similar to the terminated Waiver
and would enforce the contract ban. 11 While federal law on this issue remains unchanged
since the termination of Texas's first Waiver, CMS rescinded guidance interpreting
the free choice provision to bar the contract bans in 2018. 12 The letter advised that
"qualified" could not be construed to exclude providers on political grounds "unrelated
to their fitness to perform covered services or the adequacy of their billing practices." 13
This Note argues that states may not use laws purporting to limit contract eligibility
to redefine the term "qualified" to suit their political purposes and that such contract
bans are a violation of the free choice provision that may not be waived under the
Secretary's§ 1115 authority. 14 Part II of this Note explores Texas's ongoing efforts to
remove Planned Parenthood from its Medicaid operations. 15 Part III provides a global
review of Medicaid family planning policy, and Part IV explores the parameters of the

8
See Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHlP Servs., U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., to Kay Ghahremani, Comm'r, Tex. Medicaid & CHIP (Nov. 7, 2012).

9

See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Missouri Section 1115 Demonstration Fact Sheet,
Missouri Women's Health Services (Oct. 6, 2017) (stating that the program was terminated effective
March 6, 2017), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/
Waivers/1115/downloads/mo/mo-health-services-program-fs.pdf; see also Ctrs. for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., Medicaid Section 1115 Demonstration Fact Sheet, Iowa Family Planning Network
(Jan. 2, 2018) (announcing that the program was terminated effective June 30, 2017), https://www.
medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ia/iafami:ly-planni:ng-network- fs. pdf.
10
See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2012); see also State Waivers List, MEDICAID.Gov, https://www.medicaid.
gov/medi:caid/section-1115-demo/demonstration-and-waiver-list/index.html (last visited Nov. 30,
2018) (stating that programs authorized under§§ 1915(b) and 1915(c) are also known as Waivers).

11

Marissa Evans, Texas Wants to Renew Federal Women :S Health Funding ft Lost Over Planned
Parenthood, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE (May 16, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/20 l 7 /05/16/womenshealth-programs-saw-sharp-decline-clients/.
12

See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, State Medicaid Director Letter# 18-003, Re:
Rescinding SMD #16-005 (Jan. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Rescinding SMD] https://www.medicaid.gov/
federal-policy-guidance/downloads/smdl8003.pdf.
13 Id.
14

See
Part VI (outlining limits on § 1115 authority and arguing that free choice may not be
waived to exclude politically disfavored providers).
15

See
Part II (explaining Texas' histmy of efforts to remove abortion providers from Medicaid
family planning programs and state equivalents).
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free choice provision in depth. 16 Part V asserts that barring Planned Parenthood from
holding Medicaid provider contracts or terminating Planned Parenthood contracts on
political grounds is a violation of the free choice provision. 17 Finally, Part VI concludes
that the violation described in Part V may not be waived by the Secretary under his §
1115 authority. 18

II. PROVIDER POLITICS: A TEXAN CASE STUDY IN PUTTING
IDEOLOGY OVER CARE
From 2007 to 2012, Texas operated a family planning Waiver, which offered Medicaid
family planning benefits to those not otherwise eligible for Medicaid pursuant to
§ 1115(a)(2). 19 Texas offers Medicaid to pregnant women up to 203% of the federal
poverty level, which is an annual calculation of the highest income at which the federal
government considers a person or family to be living in poverty; however, childless adults
without a qualifying disability are not eligible for Medicaid. 20 Parents of minor children
emolled in the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) must have incomes below
18% of the federal poverty level to receive benefits. 21 The terminated Waiver, entitled
the Texas Women's Health Waiver, offered family planning benefits to individuals up
to 185% of the federal poverty line. 22 The Waiver program provided family planning
benefits, but not the full spectrum of Medicaid benefits. 23 The Expenditure Authority,
which authorizes states to claim federal reimbursement under Medicaid for the costs
of their Waiver programs, was set to expire on December 31, 2011. 24 The Expenditure
Authority was briefly extended to allow for renewal negotiations and to facilitate the
transition from the federally- funded program under Medicaid to an independent state-

16

See

Part rn (describing the three modalities of Medicaid family planning).

17

See
Part V (arguing that excluding abortion providers from Medicaid is a violation of the
free choice provision)
18
See
Part VI (concluding that the violation of free choice is not within the discretionary
waiver authority of the Secretary)
19
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Expenditure Authority No. l l-W-00232/6, Texas
Women's Health Waiver (2006) [hereinafter Texas
https://www.medicaid.
gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/ l l l 5/dow11loads/tx1Womens-HealthWaiver/tx-womens-health-waiver-expnditme-auth-12302006- l 2312011.pdf
20

See Medicaid and CHIP
Pregnant Women
Planning
Programs, KAISER FAM. FouNo. (Jan. 12, 2017), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Medicaid-andCHIP-Eligibility-as-of-Jan-2017-Table-4.
21

See id

22

See id; see also Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., l 115(a) Research and Demonstration
Waiver, Texas Women's Health Program 1, 3 (2011) [hereinafter Texas Women~· Health Waiver]
https://\VVl'W.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics1Waivers/ 1115/
dov11nloads/tx1Womens-Health-\Vaiver/tx-womens-health-waiver-research-demo-waiver. pdf
23

See Texas Womens Health Waiver, supra note 22, at 3.
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funded program. 25 As a result, federal funding ended on December 31, 2012, and the
state began an entirely self-funded replacement. 26
Texas initially sought to renew the waiver for an additional year rather than allow the
Expenditure Authority to expire. 27 However, the extension requests sought to alter the
Waiver by requesting that the Secretary also waive the free choice provision to allow the
state to ban abortion providers from holding contracts under the Waiver. 28 Though Texas
requested a waiver of the provision "to the extent necessary," the state maintained that
its proposal did not violate the provision, and therefore waiver was unnecessary. 29 Texas
sought to implement Human Resources Code § 32.024(c-l), which targeted entities
contracting to provide care under family planning Waivers. 30 Under the provision,
providers were ineligible to participate in the Waiver if their practice included abortion
care. 31 Accordingly, the Secretary of HHS would not authorize the waiver renewal
because the free choice provision was not likely to promote the objectives of the Act as
required under§ 1115. 32
a. The Texas Human Resources Code and Abortion-Providing Entities

When Texas applied for the 2007 Waiver, the state law that authorized Texas Health and
Human Services Commission to seek the Waiver dictated that "money spent under the
demonstration project, regardless of the funding source, [may] not [be] used to perform
or promote elective abortions. The department . . . may not contract with entities
that perform or promote elective abortions or are affiliates of entities that perform or
promote elective abortions." 33 The previously proposed language only barred Waiver
funds from being used to perform elective abortions, which was consistent with federal

25

See Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir. of the Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., to Billy Millwee,
Assoc. Comm'r for Medicaid & CHIP, Health & Human Servs. Comm'n (Mar. 15, 2012)
[hereinafter March
Mann to Millwee]; see also Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir. of
the Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicare Servs., to Billy Millwee,
Assoc. Comm'r for Medicaid & CHIP, Health & Human Servs. Comm'n (Dec. 12, 20 l l)
[hereinafter December
A1ann to A1illwee] https://senatorjoserodriguez.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/03/CMS-Letter-to-HHSC-re-WHP 12.12.2011.pdf
26
See Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., US. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., to Kay Ghahremani, Comm'r, Tex. Medicaid & CHIP (Nov. 7, 2012) [hereinafter
Mann to 1vlillwee].

27
See Texas Health and Human Services Commission, 11 lS(a) Research and Demonstration
Waiver: Texas Women's Health Program (20 l l) (requesting renewal of the expenditure authority
through December 31, 2013), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/
By-Topics/Waivers/ 1115/downloads/tx/Womens-Health-Waiver/tx-womens-health-waiver-researchdemo-waiver.pdf
2s Id
29

Id

30

Tex. Hum Res. Code§ 32.024(c-l) (2017).
Id

31
32

See supra, December

Mann to A1illwee.

33

See S. 747, 79th Leg., R.S. (Tex. 2005), https://capitoLtexas.gov/tlodocs/79Rlbilltext/pdf/
SB00747Fpdf#navpanes=O.
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Medicaid policy restricting the use of federal funds to pay for abortions. 34 This policy
takes form in an annual appropriations rider, known as the Hyde Amendment, which
is an amendment to the appropriations bill that restricts the use of the appropriated
funds. 35 The legislation now exists in renewed form as § 32.024(c-l) of the Human
Resources Code. 36
While the contract ban was part of Texas law and the Waiver applications at both initial
authorization and renewal application, Planned Parenthood clinics not performing
abortions participated in the Waiver despite being legally affiliated with Planned
Parenthood Federation of America. 37 Planned Parenthood clinics participated in the
Waiver with the understanding that clinics remained eligible as long as the participating
clinic did not recommend elective abortion to Waiver patients and maintained a
separate legal identity from the Planned Parenthood clinics that provide or recommend
abortion. 38 By 2011, when the Waiver was due to expire, Planned Parenthood clinics
were providing nearly half of the care covered by the Waiver. 39 During that time, Planned
Parenthood was amidst the first of two "undercover" video campaigns and budget
fights on Capitol Hill, which drew a critical eye to the organization's participation in
public health care programs. 40
b. Texas v. Sebelius

When negotiations to renew the Waiver with the contract ban resulted in the termination
of the Waiver by CMS, Texas filed suit. 41 Texas claimed that the 2007 waiver had
identical restrictions on participation of abortion providers despite Planned Parenthood
affiliates holding contracts to provide care under the Waiver. 42 The 2007 application
included a statement that abortion providers and affiliates would not be permitted to
obtain provider contracts. 43 Contrary to the state's position, the Waiver Expenditure

34

Id

35

See Neal Devins,
Riders, WM. & MARY 66-67 (1994),
wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2679&context=facpubs; see also The
and
Services, KAISER FAM. FouND. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.kff.org/womenshealth-policy/perspective/the-hyde-amendment-and-coverage-for-abortion-services/.
36

See Tex. Hum. Res. Code§ 32.024(c-1) (2017).

37

See Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Hidalgo County Tex., Inc. v. Suehs, 692 F.3d 343, 34 7 (5th
Cir. 2012) (explaining that Planned Parenthood Federation of America operates clinics that
abortion services and engage in abortion rights advocacy).
38

See id.

Texas v. Sebelius \W.D. Tex. 2012) (Case No. 6: 12-cv-62); see also Peter Shin et
Potential Impact
s
on Access to
Low-income Women, RCHN CrnvIMUNITY HEALTH FOUNDATION RESEARCH COLLABORATIVE
(May4, 2012),
40

See Erik Eckholm,
2011 ), https://vv\vw.n;iimes.com/20 l l/02/l 8/us/politics/18parenthood.html

41

See Complaint at 1, Texas v. Sebelius (WD. Tex. 2012) (No. 6: 12-cv-62).

42

See id at~ 11; see also Shin, supra note 39.

43

See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Texas Women's Health Section 1115 Demonstration
Waiver Application (Dec. 28, 2005) (explaining that Texas's 2005 Waiver application references
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Authority was not the blanket grant Texas requested, but instead an itemized list of
waived requirements that did not include the free choice provision. 44
Texas's complaint asserted the state did not need CMS to waive compliance with the free
choice provision because federal law only required that a state guarantee choice among
qualified providers, and the effect of the Texas provision was that abortion providers
were not qualified to provide care financed by Medicaid. 45 The state also argued that
barring abortion providers from providing Medicaid services only furthered federal
Medicaid policy objectives. Since Congress had long forbidden the use of federal funds
to pay for abortions except in narrow circumstances, the provision only promoted the
objectives of the act. 46 The state claimed that neither Texas nor the federal government
should indirectly subsidize abortion providers with Medicaid funds. 47 Finally, the state
argued that the Secretary's refusal to waive the free choice provision and subsequent
termination of the Waiver was an unlawful attempt to coerce Texas into repealing or
not enforcing Human Resources Code § 32.024(c-l), therefore violating the Tenth
Amendment. 48 Following a denial of Texas's request for preliminary injunction, the suit
was dismissed without prejudice. 49 When federal funding ended in December 2012,
Texas began implementing a fully state funded program.
c. Texas's Self-Funded "Fix"
Following the expiration of Texas's waiver, the state began to self-fund an equivalent
family planning program on its own terms. 50 Since federal funding ended in December

the contract ban, in the "Eligible Providers" section, but does not request the waiver of any specific
provisions in order to effectuate the ban).
44

See Texas Expenditure Authority, supra note 19, at 11 (explaining that the expenditme authority
denotes subsections of§ 1902 as opposed to§ 1396a, and that§ 1902 is the sectionnmnberwithin
the Social Security Act that correlates to the same provisions as codified at 42 US.C. § 1396a).
45

See Complaint at 6, Texas v. Sebelius (WD. Tex. 2012) (No. 6: 12-cv-62).

46

See id.

See id. at iJ 31; see also Alina Salganicoff et al., The Hyde Amendment and Coverage for
Abortion Services, KAISER FAM. FouND. (Oct. 16, 2017) (explaining that states may use their uwn
funds to provide abortion coverage through Medicaid without federal fund matching; nineteen states
currently do so), https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/perspective/the-hyde-amendment-andcoverage-for-abortion-services.
47

48

See P Mot. Smn. J. at 27, Texas v. Sebelius (WD. Tex. 2012) (Case No. 6:12-cv-62). But see
Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1068 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that the "legislative scheme, with its
mandatory language and detailed requirements, evidences a clear Congressional intent to take
certain decisions away from state officials ... federalism argmnents have less weight in the context
of a waiver of a congressional requirement. \Ve are not examining the Secretary's authority to
interfere with state official's discretion, but rather her authority to waive compliance with federal
statutes.") (citing Rosado v. Wyman, 397 US. 397, 417 (1970)).
49

See Order of Dismissal, Texas v. Sebelius (WD. Tex. 2013) (Case No. 6: 12-cv-62); see also
Jordan Smith, State Cannot Ban Planned Parenthood and Keep Federal Funds for Womens
Health Program, THE AusnN CHRONICLE, (Dec. 22, 2012), https://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/
news/2012-12-22/state-cannot-ban-planned-parenthood-and-keep-federal- funds-for-whp/.
50

See Stacey Pogue, Excluding Planned Parenthood Has Been Terrible for Texas Women,
Center for Public Policy Priorities 1, 2 (2017), https://forabettertexas.org/in1ages/HW_2017 _08_
PlannedParenthoodExclusion.pdf.
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2012, the program has been funded by a variety of sources under several different
names. 51 There have been two major obstacles in addition to the exclusion of abortion
providers: first, the state severely underfunded the program in its first years; second, it
implemented a tiered provider system that strongly disfavored provider practices that
were dedicated to reproductive health care. 52 Since federal funding was terminated,
emollment across equivalent programs in Texas has reduced by 29% with a 39%
reduction in access to care and a 41 % decrease in access to contraception as compared
to the end of the federally funded program. 53
The self-funded programs reduced utilization of highly effective long-acting reversible
contraceptives (LARCs) and injectable contraceptives, which resulted in higher rates of
unintended pregnancy among beneficiaries. 54 Researchers found the decrease in LARC
utilization was not correlated with the longer effective-life of these contraceptives, which
indicates that decreased usage correlates with decreased availability. 55 Unintended
pregnancy rates increased in the areas that lost coverage through Planned Parenthood
affiliates, but continued to decline in the areas that never had a Planned Parenthood
affiliate. 56 This disruption indicates that the removal of Planned Parenthood was a
cause of decreased access to and continuity of services, especially in communities
without family planning providers. 57 Texas published inaccurate information and data
about providers in the state funded program. 58 Texas claimed to have had 4,012 unique

51

See MaryBeth Musmneci et al., Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: A Look at the
Current Landscape ofApproved and Pending Waivers, KAISER FAM. FouND. (Sept. 20, 2018), https://
'Nww.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/section-1115-medicaid-demonstration-waivers-a-look-at-thecmrent-landscape-of-approved-and-pending-waivers/.
52

See Kinsey Hasstedt & Adam Sonfield, At It Again: Texas Continues to Undercut Access to
Reproductive Health Care, GuTTMACHER INST. 1(July18, 2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/
article/2017 /07 /it-again-texas-continues-undercut-access-reproductive-health-care.
53 See Stacey Pogue, Excluding Planned Parenthood has been Terrible for Texas Women,
Center for Public Policy Priorities (2017), https://forabettertexas.org/images/HW_2017 _08_
PlannedParenthoodExclusion.pdf.

54

See Kari \Vhite et al., The Impact ofReproductive Health Legislation on Family Planning
Clinic Services in Texas, 105 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 851, 851 (2015) (explaining that before federal
funding ended in 2011, 71 % of participating providers offered LARCs, and in 2013 only 46% of
participating providers offered LARCs, since decreased funding made the high up-front costs of
LARCs prohibitive); see also Amanda J. Stevenson et al., Effect ofRemoval ofPlanned Parenthood
from the Texas Womens Health Program, 374 N. ENGL. J. MED. 853, 853 (2016) (showing a relative
reduction of 35.5% in long-acting reversible contraceptives and 31.3% for injectable contraceptives).
55
See \Vhite et al., supra note 54, at 854 (discussing that decreased availability seems to be
affected by both provider exclusion and tiering and the high up-front costs of LARCs, exacerbated
by the fact that disfavored providers lost eligibility for rebated pharmaceutical prices. Excluded and
lower-tier providers are also more likely to have experience in administering LARCs, and therefore
the exclusions and tearing not only decreased availability of the pharmaceuticals themselves, but of
participating providers who can administer them).
56

See Stevenson et al., supra note 54, at 858

57

See Stevenson et al., supra note 54, at 853-860.

58

See NARAL Pro-Choice Texas, 2015 TEXAS WOMEN'S HEALTH PROGRAM REPORT (2015), https://
\'l'ww.scribd.com/document/260127216/2015-NARA.L-TX-TWHP-Study.
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providers emolled in the self-funded program at the end of Fiscal Year 2014. 59 However,
a spot-check investigation by NARAL Pro-Choice Texas of 681 listings revealed only
236 unique "providers," and only 17% of those listings were practices that provided
routine genealogical preventative services. 60
In October 2018, the Texas Health and Human Services Commission terminated the
contracts of an organization called the Heidi Group, which repeatedly received among
the largest contracts in the program while repeatedly failing to meet service goals. 61
The Heidi Group estimated that it could serve 50,000 beneficiaries of the state-funded
program in fiscal year 2017, but ended up serving less than 2,500. 62 Even though the
group also failed to meet service goals in 2018, its contracts were renewed for fiscal year
2019 before being terminated. 63
d. Healthy Texas Women

In June 201 7, Texas filed a new request for a § 1115 Waiver with CMS entitled "Healthy
Texas Women." 64 The new Waiver request is substantively the same as the terminated
waiver, and references the provider ban, which is now permanent state law. 65 The
proposed Waiver would increase the income cutoff from 185% of the federal poverty
line to 200%. 66 Minors were not eligible to receive benefits under the terminated Waiver,
but the new Waiver would allow minors fifteen and older to receive benefits if a parent
applies on her behalf. 67 The new Waiver would cover the same benefits as the terminated
Waiver. 68 If the Waiver is granted, beneficiaries will automatically transfer into the
Waiver population. 69 Texas proposed that the Waiver become effective September 1,
2018, for a five year period ending August 31, 2023. 70 Though this start date has passed,

s9

Id.

60

Id.

61

See Marissa Evans, State Cancels Health Contracts With Anti-Abortion Heidi
TruBUNE (Oct. 12, 2018),
anti-abortion-heidi-group/; see also
Novack, Texas Anti-Abortion
Promised to Serve 70,000 Women: It Served 3,300, THE TEXAS OBSERVER (Sep. 26, 2018), https://
v..rvvw.texasobserver.org/texas-anti-abortion-family-planning-group-promised-to-serve-70000women-it-served-3300.
62

See Novack, supra note 61.

63

See id.

64

Healthy Texas Women Section Il 15 Demonstration rrutv"r .1-1.µp1:tr..:cfltun, Texas Health and Human
Services Commission (June 30, 2017) [hereinafter Texas

65

Texas
2017, supra note 64, with Texas Womens Health Waiver§
1115 Research and Demonstration Waiver, Texas Health and Human Services Commission (Dec.
28, 2005) [hereinafter Texas Demonstration Waiver 2005].
66

See Texas

67

Id.

2017, supra note 64, at 10.

68

69
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See Texas
Id.
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CMS has not denied the Waiver and it could potentially be approved with a later start
date agreed upon by Texas and CMS. 71

III.A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MEDICAID FAMILY PLANNING POLICY
States offer Medicaid family planning benefits in three modalities to serve several
population groups. Full Medicaid beneficiaries receive family planning benefits as part
of their mandatory benefits package. 72 States may also expand the eligibility for family
planning benefits in one of two ways: through either a§ 1115 Waiver program or a State
Plan Amendment (SPA). 73
a. Mandatory Benefits

Shortly after the Supreme Court held that all adults had a right to privacy in their use
of contraceptives in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the SSA was amended in 1972 to make family
planning services a standard Medicaid benefit. 74 The federal government pays 90% of
the costs of family planning benefits instead of the regular Federal Medical Assistance
Percentage (FMAP) rate for the jurisdiction, which distributes Medicaid costs between
the state and federal governments according to a formula that compares per capita
income in the state to nationwide per capita income. 75 FMAP rates currently vary from
50%, the minimum set by federal law, to 76%. 76 For the beneficiaries who receive full
Medicaid, family planning benefits are just one of the many categories of coverage they
have access to as members of a traditional coverage population. Benefit design, which
describes what services are covered and eligibility by age and gender, varies from state
to state. 77

71

See Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 1115 Waivers by State, MISER
FAM. FouND. (Jan. 9, 2019), https://wwwJcfforg/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-waiver-trackerapproved-and-pending-section-1115-waivers-by-state.
72

42 U.S.C. § l396d(a)(4)(C) (2012).

73

See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119, § 2303 (2010); see also Usha
Ranji et al., Medicaid and Family Planning: Background and Implications
MISER FAM.
FouND. (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.kff.org/report-section/medicaid-and-family-planning-medicaidfamily-planning-policy.
74
See Social Security Act, Pub. Law No. 92-603, § 299E, 86 Stat. 1329, 1462-63 (1972), codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(C) (2012); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding
that the privacy interest in the use of contraceptives protected by the Court's decision in Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), could not be limited to married couples under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).

75

See 42 U.S.C. §1396b(a)(5) (2012) (showing the federal government pays 90% of costs of
care and 50% of administrative costs); see also Federal Financial Participation in State Assistance
Expenditures, 80 Fed. Reg. 73779 (proposed Nov. 25, 2015).
See Federal ~Medical Assistance Percentage
and Multiplier, MISER FAM.
FOUND. (2018), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/federal-matching-rate-and-multiplier/?
currentTimeframe=O&sortModel=%7B%22colid%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22
%7D.
76

77

See Minors 'Access to Contraceptive Services, GurrMACHER INST. 1 (2018), https://www.
guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/minors-access-contraceptive-services; see also Payment
and Coverage for the Prevention
Transmitted Infections (ST!s), KAISER FAM. FouND.
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b. Section 1115 Waivers
For over twenty years, CMS has allowed states to extend family planning benefits to
individuals who do not qualify for Medicaid, but whose incomes would make them
categorically eligible if they were pregnant. 78 To create these programs, the Secretary
authorizes discretionary waivers of Medicaid requirements under § 1115 of the SSA.
Waived provisions typically include the amount, duration, the scope of services
requirement, 79 the EPSDT requirement, 80 the retroactive coverage provision, 81 and
the prospective payment provisions. 82 Expenditure Authorities for Waiver programs
dictate that for a specified period, expenditures under the Waiver will be regarded as
regular expenditures under the state's Medicaid plan and unwaived provisions of the
SSA still apply. 83
Section 1115 allows the Secretary to waive compliance with various requirements of the
Social Security Act, including federal Medicaid law, for the purposes of "experimental,
pilot, or demonstration project[s]" when the Secretary believes authorizing a waiver "is
likely to assist in promoting the objectives" of the Act. 84 Section 1115 has also been
used to promote a variety of Medicaid objectives including delivery system reform
and authorizing modified Medicaid expansions under the Affordable Care Act (ACA).
Additionally, Waivers authorize coverage for services not authorized by the SSA, such
as behavioral health and long-term care. 85
CMS 's longstanding policy is that Waiver programs are budget neutral, meaning they
do not increase federal expenditures when compared to the state's Medicaid program

1 (2017), https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/fact-sheet/payment-and-coverage-for-theprevention-of-sexually-transmitted-infections-stis/.
78

See Usha Ranji et al., lvfedicaid and Family Planning: Background and Implications of the
ACA, KAISER FAM. FouND. (Feb. 3, 2016), https://wv:w.kff.org/report-section/medicaid-and-familyplanning-medicaid-family-planning-policy.
79

42 U.S.C § 1396a(a)(10)(B) (2012) (providing that all Medicaid beneficiaries shall be eligible for
the same amount, duration, and scope of services).
80

42 U.S.C § 1396a(a)(43)(A) (stating that early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment
benefits are targeted at Medicaid beneficiaries under the age of twenty-one to screen for and treat
physical, mental, developmental, dental, hearing, and vision problems and delays).
81
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34) (stating that retroactive coverage allows for coverage of services
rendered up to three months before the beneficiary submits an application for Medicaid and is
generally intended to ensure that providers administer medically necessary care when a Medicaideligible patient presents for it, even if the patient does not currently have Medicaid).
82

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(15) (requiring that the Prospective Payment system establishes
reimbursement levels and systems that apply to traditional Medicaid, which are waived to allow the
states to compensate family planning providers solely for those services).
83

See Texas Expenditure Authority, supra note 19.

84

42 U.S.C. § 1315(a).

85

See MaryBeth Musumeci et al., Section 1115 i\1edicaid Demonstration Waivers: A Look at the
La,>Jas·ca1Je ofApproved and Pending Waivers, KAISER FAM. FouND. (Sept. 20, 2018), https:/I
W\Vw.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/section- 1115-medicaid-demonstration-waivers-a-look-at-thecurrent-landscape-of-approved-and-pending-waivers/.
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without the Waiver. 86 Family planning waivers are approved and funded on the principle
that providing contraceptive coverage to women who would be eligible for Medicaid
pregnancy coverage reduces Medicaid-covered pregnancies and births, which are more
costly than family planning programs. 87
c. State Plan Amendments
The ACA allowed states to amend their state Medicaid plans to permanently incorporate
expanded family planning programs. 88 Instead of using the Waiver authority, which
requires evaluation as demonstrations and periodic renewal, states can create a
permanent eligibility category for the population served through the Waivers. 89 Fifteen
states have obtained SPAs, ten states continue to operate expanded family planning
benefits as § 1115 demonstrations, and the remaining twenty-five states do not have
expanded family planning benefits. 90 Only beneficiaries fully emolled in Medicaid have
access to Medicaid family planning coverage. 91
IV. FREEDOM OF CHOICE: THE PROVISION PROTECTING
ABORTION PROVIDERS AND THEIR MEDICAID PATIENTS
The SSA requires states to allow Medicaid beneficiaries to access covered benefits
from any qualified provider willing to administer care. 92 Both the SSA and federal
regulations pertaining to the provision show an intent to protect free choice in the family
planning context, specifically beyond free choice for other medical care. 93 The free
choice provision exempts family planning from managed care and beneficiaries must
be allowed to obtain their family planning benefits from outside the network at no extra
cost. 94 While free choice can be waived to implement a managed care system, family
planning benefits continue to operate outside of the managed care framework. 95
Enforceability of individual Medicaid provisions by recipients is uncertain following
the Supreme Court's 2002 ruling in Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, which narrowed the
86 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Budget
Form, nu1ps:11wvvV1r.m,emcaic1.
gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/waivers/ 1115/downloads/interiml 115-budget-

87

See Texas Women's Health Program Application (Dec. 28, 2005).

88

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat 119, § 2303 (2010).

89

supra note 19, with California Medicaid State Plan, State
Mar. 24, 2011)
permanent change to state's Medicaid
certain beneficiaries to access family planning benefits only).
1~nnrov1e11

Plan
90

See Usha Ranji et aL, State Medicaid
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2009)
passage of the Affordable Care Act, 24 states were operating
kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.corn/2013/01/8015.pdf
91

See id

92

42 US.C. § l 396a(a)(23)(A) (2012).

93

42 US.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(B); 42 C.ER § 431.51 (2012).

94

42 US.C. §

waivers),

(2012).

95

See 42 US.C. § 1396n (2012)
the legal
for the establislnnent ofMCOs,
followed by subsection
which exempts family plam1ing benefits from the waiver of free
choice inherent in MCO arrangements).
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circumstances under which a federal statute confers a private right of action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. 96 In narrowing these circumstances, the Court declined to overturn
previous precedent in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, which vested a §1983
action in Medicaid beneficiaries to enforce rate-setting provisions, and left untouched
the precedent in 0 'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, which held the free choice
provision enforceable. 97
In 2017, following Gonzaga, the Eighth Circuit held in Does v. Gillespie that the free
choice provision does not vest a§ 1983 cause of action in Medicaid beneficiaries. 98 This
holding allowed Arkansas to terminate Planned Parenthood of Arkansas and Eastern
Oklahoma's Medicaid contracts without deciding whether the action violated the free
choice provision. The court read the 0 'Bannon holding as a denial of any right vested in
the free choice provision, but ultimately decided that the right had not been violated. 99
Additionally, the holding in Doe v. Gillespie departed from four other circuit courts
and created the first significant circuit split since Gonzaga on the enforceability of a
provision of Medicaid via a§ 1983 action. 100

V. ELIMINATING ABORTION-PROVIDING FAMILY PLANNING
PROVIDERS VIOLATES THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
Drawing on jurisprudence from the four circuit courts to substantively consider the
state's power to define "qualified," Texas's state law contract ban violates the free choice
provision and is therefore unenforceable in traditional Medicaid. States may not use
the term "qualified" to make abortion providers categorically ineligible to participate in
Medicaid. Although Texas claims it has an absolute power to do so without Waiver, its
efforts to remove Planned Parenthood from traditional Medicaid counsel show otherwise.
a. Defining "Qualified"

In Texas v. Sebelius, Texas asserted the free choice provision did not conflict with the
state's contract ban because the free choice provision protects beneficiaries' access to
qualified providers and the contract ban merely dictated which providers are qualified,
and were therefore eligible to enter into provider contracts. 101 Texas renewed these
arguments in a pending application to obtain a new Waiver under substantially the same

96

See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 US. 273 (2002).

97

See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 US. 498, 524 (1990); see also O'Bannon v. Town Comi
Ctr., 447 US. 773, 785 (1980).

98

See Does v:

99

867 F3d 1034, 1046
in the free choice
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the state but
enforcement of the
at all).
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conditions as the proposal that resulted in termination in 2012, anticipated by the change
in administration. 102
Appellate courts have repeatedly dismissed this argument, including in the Fifth
Circuit. 103 In Rosado v. Wyman, the Supreme Court explicitly disapproved of
states redefining terms that appear in the SSA by state legislative fiat to avoid an
unsatisfactory application of federal law. 104 States have the power to set provider
qualifications, and federal regulations allow states to set "reasonable standards" for
providers. 105 However, this authority may not be used to transform the term "qualified"
into "a Medicaid-specific term of art conferring upon the states plenary authority to
withhold Medicaid funds on any policy grounds they prefer to pursue." 106 "Qualified"
must be given its plain meaning. The states' power to set qualifications in the Medicaid
context is tied to the traditional power to police the practice of medicine within their
borders. 107 Furthermore, the term is modified by the language immediately following:
"to perform the service or services required." 108 The Seventh Circuit found that the
term "qualified" in this context unambiguously relates to the professional and clinical
competence of providers. 109
Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits considered and found invalid contract bans
mirroring Texas 's. 110 In Betlach, Arizona claimed that the free choice provision enabled
states to exclude providers "for any reason supplied by state law," thus allowing the
legislature to pass a state law excluding any provider for any reason. 111 Texas's defense
of its contract ban in Texas v. Sebelius likewise makes this argument. 112 The Betlach

102
See Healthy Texas Women Section 1115 Demonstration Waiver Application, TEx. HEALTH AND
HuMAN SERVS. CoMM'N (Jun. 30, 2017), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-ProgramInformation/By-Topics/Waivers/1l15/downloads/tx/tx-healthy-women-pa.pdf.
103

See Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee, 862 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).

104

See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 457 (1970) (holding that New York "may not redefine its
standard of need in such a way that it skirts the requirement of re-evaluating its existing standard;"
it was impermissible to define standard of need to avoid the responsibility to adjust it to changing
costs ofliving).
105

42 C.F.R. § 431.5 l(c)(2); see also Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Missouri v. Andersen,
882 F.3d 1205, 1230 (10th Cir. 2018).
106

See Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d 960, 969-70 (9th Cir. 2013).

107

See Andersen, 882 F.3d at 1230; see also Gee, 862 F.3d at 465; Betlach, 727 F.3d at 969; see
also Planned Parenthood oflnd., Inc. v. Comm'r of the Ind. State Dep't of Health, 699 F.3d 962, 980
(7th Cir. 2012).
108

See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23); see also Indiana, 699 F.3d at 978 (holding that the use of the
term "reasonable" limits state power to define qualified to "pe1missible variations in the ordinary
concept" of the term); see also Betlach, 727 F.3d at 969 (finding that "to perform the service or
services required" modified "qualified").
109

Indiana, 699 F.3d at 978.

110

See Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d 960, 969-70 (9th Cir. 2013); see also
Planned Parenthood Ind., Inc. v. Comm'r Ind. State Dep't Health, 699 F.3d 962, 980 (7th Cir. 2012).
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Betlach, 727 F.3d at 969.

112

See P Mot. Preliminary Inj. at 14-18, Texas v. Sebelius (WD. Tex. 2012) (No. 6: 12-cv-62-WSS)
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Court found that in addition to defying the ordinary meaning of the term, to hold that
Arizona could exclude providers for any reason at all would abrogate the duty to give
meaning to every word of a statute and allow for the production of absurd results. 113
Such a decision would permit states to undermine Medicaid beneficiaries' statutory
rights by moving the term away from its meaning grounded in quality and competency
of care and towards a mere dictate of contract eligibility.
In Indiana, the state narrowed the claimed state power slightly, arguing that the state
could exclude providers for any reason that furthers a legitimate state interest, and
that preventing the "indirect subsidization of abortion" is a legitimate state interest,
but the Seventh Circuit ultimately found this argument unpersuasive. 114 While the state
suggested that a state law could not define qualified merely in order to target choice
of providers, an interpretation of the statute that permits diminishing free choice for
reasons unrelated to ability to provide care "inverts what the statute says." 115 The
court interpreted the state's action as an attempt to fashion a loophole in the law by
labeling exclusionary rules "qualifications." 116 The free choice provision does not
protect beneficiaries' ability to choose between providers that the state finds politically
unobjectionable, rather it protects the ability ofbeneficiaries to choose from all providers
capable of and willing to provide care. 117 The Fifth Circuit, Seventh Circuit, Ninth
Circuit, and the Tenth Circuit have held the state's power to qualify providers cannot
be used to exclude clinics performing abortion when the practitioners are licensed to
administer the covered care. 118
b. Texas's Blocked Enforcement Action Against Texas
Planned Parenthood Affiliates
The Human Resources Code only imposes the provider restr1ct10ns on providers
under the Waiver, but does not interfere with the ability of those entities to enter into
provider contracts to provide care to beneficiaries in traditional Medicaid. 119 Texas
initiated enforcement actions against Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas (PPGT) to
invalidate contracts held under traditional Medicaid, but the Health and Human Services
Commission was enjoined by the District Court for the Western District of Texas from

part1c1pa1Jon would violate a Puerto Rico anti-kickback law since the free choice nrrivN.um does not
in Puerto Rico).
113

See Betlach, 727 F3d at 970
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United States v. Menasche, 348 US. 528 (1955)).

See Planned Parenthood oflnd. v. Comm'r Ind. State Dep'1 Health, 699 F3d 962, 978
2012).
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116
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See id at 980.

Cir.

118

See Planned Paren1hood of Kan, & Mid-Missouri v. Andersen, 882 F3d 1205, 1229, 1246
Cir. 2018); see also Plalllled Parenthood Golf Coast, Inc., v. Gee, 862 F3d 445, 465
Cir. 2017);
see also Parenthood Ariz., lnc. v. Betlach, 727 F3d 960, 974
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terminating the provider agreements held by PPGT affiliate clinics. 120 Although Texas
claims that it does not violate the free choice provision to bar abortion providers and
their affiliates from Medicaid, it has not attempted to pass a law paralleling Human
Resources Code§ 32.024(c-l). 121
In Betlach, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the difference between excluding an
individual provider on account of improper or illegal conduct and banning an entire
class of providers "on the ground that their scope of practice includes certain perfectly
legal medical procedures." 122 The Fifth Circuit applied this principle in Gee, and while
Louisiana argued Planned Parenthood was unqualified to provide care covered by
Medicaid, the state conceded that the terminated clinics were clinically competent. 123
The Inspector General of the Commission for Texas initially sent a letter to PPGT in
October 2015 informing PPGT that their provider agreements were being terminated
for alleged crimes and program violations. 124 No action was taken until over a year
later, when the state sent out another termination notice in December 2016. 125 The
termination letter alleged that an investigation revealed Planned Parenthood received
illegal payments for fetal tissue and altered procedures for the purpose of obtaining
tissue to sell, which was a practice that violated generally accepted medical standards. 126
The district court, however, found that the Inspector General had no factual basis for
terminating the provider agreements. 127 As a result, the court concluded that PPGT
could not lawfully be excluded from Medicaid, because the Inspector General had not
proven that PPGT clinics were unqualified to provide the covered services. 128
Although Texas alleges that § 32.024(c-1) is compatible with the free choice provision,
and that federal law does not bar the state from removing Planned Parenthood from
Medicaid, the law Texas has passed to that effect applies only to programs requiring
additional federal approval. 129 Instead of passing a state law that would de facto
disqualify Planned Parenthood across all Medicaid programing, the state brought an
enforcement action against one of the Planned Parenthood entities that provides care to

120 Plam1ed Parenthood Greater Tex.
Supp. 3d 974, 1000 (WD. Tex. 2017).

& Preventative Health Servs. v. Smith, 236 F

121 See Texas Women :5 Health
TEx. HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVS.
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See Smith, 236 F Supp. 3d at 984-86.
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traditional Medicaid beneficiaries. 130 The state did not claim the power to debar Planned
Parenthood on the mere basis of policy, but rather attempted to make a case out of
affirmative wrongdoing by the clinic. 131

VI. FREE CHOICE MAY NOT BE WAIVED FOR THE PURPOSE OF
EXCLUDING ABORTION PROVIDERS
a. Restrictions on Section 1115 Authority

Texas's proposed action, if permitted by HHS, would be reviewed under the APA,
because it would be an action by a federal administrative agency. 132 Administrative
decisions by departments of the federal government are subject to judicial review under
the APA, except where review has been proscribed by statute or the action is "committed
to agency discretion." 133 The APA provides that a court shall set aside any agency action
that is "arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion ... or not in accordance with
law." 134 While administrative decisions are entitled to a "presumption of regularity," a
court considering an APA challenge must engage in a "substantial inquiry" that goes
beyond whether the administrative action was within the scope of statutory authority. 135
A substantial inquiry includes determining whether the decision gave due consideration
to the relevant factors and screening for clear errors in judgement. 136 As a result, a
decision would be held to violate the APA if the agency:
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation
for its decision that runs contrary to the evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product
of agency expertise. 137
The Supreme Court has never considered an APA challenge to the grant of a § 1115
Waiver, but several Circuit Court of Appeals and U.S. District Courts have interpreted
the Court's APA jurisprudence in reviewing the Secretary's authority to authorize
Waivers. 138 Some courts have explicitly held that review of experimental programs is
inherently narrower than the administrative actions at issue in the Supreme Court's APA

130

See Smith, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 984-86.

131

See id.
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Cir. 1973).
133

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
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jurisprudence. 139 Each reviewing court has found that § 1115 Waivers are subject to
APA review, but the circuit courts have diverging analyses and there is no binding §
1115 jurisprudence in the Fifth Circuit, which has jurisdiction over Texas. However,
assuming the Fifth Circuit would find the grant of§ 1115 Waivers subject to APA
review, Texas's Waiver request would not withstand APA review since it does not meet
any of the three elements of§ 1115. The Ninth Circuit in Beno v. Shala/a took the
most expansive reading of the Waiver provision, finding each of the three elements of§
1115 as binding on the Secretary to grant or deny waiver requests. 140 Two other Circuits
interpreting the law found some, but not all, of these requirements binding. 141 The U.S.
District Courts are similarly mixed. 142
The Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits found the "likely to assist in promoting the
objectives of the [Social Security] Act" language ("objectives requirement") binding
upon the Secretary. 143 This language requires that the Secretary consider the impact of
the project on the people whom the underlying program was intended to benefit, and is
the element most likely to be found binding on the Secretary in the event that a grant of
Texas's request is reviewed in federal court. 144
Courts are not empowered to substitute their judgement for that of the agencies in APA
review of decision-making and should refrain from "comment[ing] on the wisdom
of" agency decision-making. 145 However, the Secretary must have a rational basis for
determining that the approved Waiver is likely to assist in promoting the objectives of
the Act. 146 Medicaid's stated objectives are
to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families with dependent children
and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose income and resources
are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services, and (2)
rehabilitation and other services to help such families and individuals attain or
retain capability for independence or self-care. 147
While the Secretary has argued that Medicaid has more nuanced objectives that afford
him more discretion, the District Court for the District of Columbia (D.D.C.) has held
that these objectives are considered primary. 148 The Secretary may not pursue other

139
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objectives of the program at the expense of the coverage goals explicitly set out in the
statutory language. 149 The Ninth Circuit also found binding the "to the extent and for
the period she finds necessary" language (hereafter "extent and period requirement"). 150
However, objections to the Waiver in Beno did not address the extent and period
requirement, and thus the court did not resolve the "precise meaning" of the extent and
period language. 151
The Third Circuit and the D.D.C. found the extent and period requirement binding,
unlike the Second Circuit. 152 In CK., the Third Circuit considered a challenge to the
extent of the waiver where plaintiffs alleged that it was unnecessary to incorporate
nearly the entire population of beneficiaries into the experimental waiver and that it
failed to make certain exceptions in applying the wavier to individual beneficiaries. 153
The plaintiffs in CK. alleged that the Secretary should only have allowed the state to
apply the terms of the Waiver to a small group of beneficiaries, while leaving others with
standard benefits. 154 While the Aguayo and Beno courts held that the Secretary does
not have to grant the Waiver request exactly as she receives it and that alterations of the
Waiver are within her discretion, the court in CK. found that the Secretary did not abuse
her discretion by granting the proposed Waiver statewide. 155
The D.D.C. held that Kentucky could not "piggyback" waivers onto a project where
those waivers were not necessary to achieve the program's goals. 156 Kentucky
proposed a program targeting the Medicaid expansion population by adding eligibility
requirements and cost-sharing provisions. 157 The D.D.C. held that the eligibility and
cost-sharing elements were not necessary to the functioning of the substance abuse
program, and therefore those elements were struck down while the substance abuse
program remained intact. 158
Lastly, examining the "experimental, pilot, or demonstration project" language
("demonstration requirement"), the Ninth Circuit in Beno held that § 1115 Waivers may
simply to "enable states to save money or to evade federal requirements" but must "test
out new ideas and ways of dealing with the problems of public welfare recipients." 159
On this theory, a "simple benefits cut" to reduce spending on cash welfare recipients did
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not satisfy the demonstration requirement. 160 Neither the Third Circuit in CK. nor the
Second Circuit in Aguayo found the demonstration requirement binding. 161 The D.D.C.
adopted Beno s analysis on the demonstration requirement, but noted an incidental loss
of coverage for some beneficiaries is not enough to violate the requirement. 162 The
objectives requirement is the element of§ 1115 most likely to be considered controlling
if Texas's proposed Waiver were granted and challenged in federal court. The extent and
period and demonstration requirements have found less broad acceptance in the courts
but may still be binding.

b. The Proposed Waiver of Section 1396a is Beyond the Scope of the Secretary's
Discretionary Authority
Not only does Texas's proposed Waiver fail to meet the requirements of§ 1115 on its
face, but Texas's self-funded program also undermines its claim to the contrary. The
proposed Waiver would not meet any of the binding requirements set out by the court
in Beno and would therefore also fail the tests set forth by both CK. and Aguayo. To
grant the Waiver would be beyond the scope of the Secretary's authority, and such action
would be subject to reversal as a violation of the APA. 163
Significantly, the Waiver request fails the objectives requirement, which every reviewing
circuit court has found binding. 164 The Waiver does not further the objectives of the act
to ban the targeted providers from Medicaid, since reducing the "indirect subsidization
of abortion" is not an objective ofMedicaid. 165 There is no rational connection between
furthering the actual objectives of the Act and barring politically disfavored providers
from the program. 166
While there may be other objectives found in the statutory text establishing the Medicaid
program, such as improving health outcomes for beneficiaries, the furnishing of covered
services to the beneficiary population is the primary objective. 167 To the extent that
160
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Texas's anti-abortion policy goals and the Hyde Amendment result in reducing public
funding available to abortion providers, the goal is null if it runs contrary to the explicit
statutory purpose of providing coverage.
Further, Texas's program proves not only the failure to meet the objectives requirement,
but an abdication of those objectives in the name of political priorities. While waiving
free choice may not affect the objectives, the Waiver itself could not be authorized
under the statute because § 1115 requires programs to improve Medicaid. 168 Beyond
any impact-neutral fac;ade lies the results of the experiment that Texas has conducted
on its own dime. The provider ban undermines the ability of Medicaid family planning
to achieve its goals by impeding not just choice, but access, leading to outcomes worse
than those of the program in which the free choice provision did apply. 169 Texas's statefunded program performs poorly across all meaningful measures: emollment numbers
are down, fewer services are being administered, some beneficiaries are unable to
access their preferred contraceptive method, and the rate of unintended pregnancy in
the beneficiary population has increased. 170 These effects are concentrated in areas that
have lost access to care from providers who also perform elective abortions. 171
A waiver of free choice that has no effect on programmatic integrity would not meet
the objective requirements of Medicaid. Likewise, it does not follow that approving
the Waiver would increase access to Medicaid family planning. The Waiver request
would automatically furtherthe objectives of the Act and the evidence from Texas's selffunded program suggests the request would undermine those objectives. Texas's Waiver
request also does not meet the extent and period requirement. Because expanded family
planning programs can operate with the free choice provision intact, the Waiver exceeds
the requirements for a demonstration project to waive the provision. The D.D.C. held
this requirement prevents the Secretary from "piggybacking" unacceptable waivers by
attaching them to acceptable ones. 172
When Texas filed suit to prevent the termination of federal funding under the Waiver,
Texas alleged that the Secretary must find that the request promotes the objectives on a
program-wide level, without parsing whether each element of the Waiver is necessary. 173
Therefore, refusal to grant the entire waiver on the basis of finding that one part of the
request was improper when the waiver on the whole might promote the objectives was
an abuse of discretion. 174 However, the Second Circuit accepted, and the Ninth Circuit
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expanded upon the ability of the Secretary to grant Waivers in part or make certain parts
of the grant conditional. 175 The Ninth Circuit in Beno held that the Secretary may reject
a project or require a project to be modified for consistency with federal requirements,
to mitigate potential harms, and to be more likely to further Medicaid's goals. 176
The Secretary exercised this modification power when Texas requested a waiver of
free choice in its application for renewal of the Texas Women's Health Waiver. 177 The
Secretary notified the state Medicaid commissioner that waiver of the free choice
provision did not meet the objectives requirement and therefore would not be granted. 178
However, the Secretary did not outright deny renewal and terminate the Waiver. Instead,
the Secretary granted an extension to allow CMS and the state to reach an agreement
that only waived Medicaid requirements to the extent necessary to carry out the project,
which Texas rejected. 179 Interpreting the extent and period requirement, the Second
Circuit explicitly disapproved of shoehorning unnecessary and harmful Waiver criteria
into an otherwise beneficial program. 180 If it is within the Secretary's power to "require
the states to modify projects" it must be within his discretion to reject a proposal ifthe
state refuses to modify their demonstration project. 181
Additionally, family planning waivers lack demonstration or experimental value, given
that§ 1115 has been used to expand family planning benefits for over twenty years. 182
The ACA authorized states to make expanded family planning benefits a part of their
permanent state Medicaid plans through a state plan amendment, and therefore the
Waiver authority is no longer necessary to offer these benefits. 183 Even if family planning
Waivers retain experimental value to pass the demonstration requirement, Texas has
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operated a self-funded program since 2013 that performs significantly worse than the
Waiver program that preceded it. The experiment has been conducted on Texas's own
dime and has failed. 184 There is no demonstrative value in supplying federal funding
to a poorly performing program to allow the state to avoid complying with federal
law. Texas's Waiver request fails to meet the legal criteria of a § 1115 Waiver under
any test that could be applied by any combination of the potentially binding elements
since it does not meet any of the three binding requirements. The requests following
Texas's, made by Tennessee and South Carolina, would also fail any level of review for
consistency with the requirements of§ 1115.

VII. CONCLUSION
Although Texas alleges that it is within its authority to bar abortion providers from its
Medicaid program, Texas's attempts to effectuate this goal in traditional Medicaid and
in expanded family planning services is to the contrary. Texas has been enjoined from
terminating Planned Parenthood from participating in traditional Medicaid yet seeks a
Waiver to enable the same result in expanded family planning services. CMS recently
revoked guidance issued in 2016 emphasizing the effects of the free choice provision
in the family planning context. 185 Regardless of the rescinded guidance, the free choice
provision and related federal regulations remain in full force.
Since the state cannot prove a programmatic violation that warrants barring abortion
providers writ large from Medicaid and since states may not label abortion providers de
facto unqualified to be Medicaid, Texas may not exclude providers absent a Waiver from
CMS. Texas's proposal to obtain such a Waiver cannot meet the criteria for approval.
Accordingly, the state may not use a law purporting to limit contract eligibility to limit
beneficiary rights for political purposes either in traditional Medicaid or by Waiver.
Texas's Waiver request must be denied, and if granted cannot surpass scrutiny under
the APA.
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